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ABSTRACT 
THEFIRST SECTION, “The Nature and Conceptualization of 
Information,” explores the essence of information and knowledge 
in general and offers some conceptual clarification. It raises the issue 
of information versus knowledge, and compares information concepts 
of different disciplines. The second section, “The Economics of In-
formation, Knowledge, and Education,” sketches the advent of in-
formation economics (including agency theory) as well as that of 
the economics of knowledge and education. Finally, the third section, 
“Information, Knowledge, and Depreciation,” attempts to come to 
grips with the depreciation issue. 
THENATURE OF INFORMATIONAND CONCEPTUALIZATION 
During the last forty years or so, the term “information” 
succeeded in pervading science, technology, as well as everyday life. 
In this regard, “information” is not unlike the term “energy” which- 
in spite of its usage since the time of Aristotle-attained widespread 
scientific and popular use during the nineteenth century.* Indeed, 
there may exist other parallels between these two concepts and perhaps 
even a more intimate common ground. Above all, i t  seems likely 
that information requires a conceptual process no less torturous than 
the one that purified the notion of energy during the last 200 years. 
Although this article is primarily concerned with economists’ 
conceptions of informationand knowledge, the first part may help 
to illuminate these crucial notions from a more general point of 
view. 
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Energy as Information and Information through Energy 
The thought that energy and information might be two facets 
of one and the same concept is still too remote for most scholars 
to contemplate. Yet, in physics, energy is defined as the potential 
to do work, which means it has the potential to change things (or 
prevent change where it would occur without a particular source 
of energy). Surprisingly, the major feature of information too is the 
potential to induce change (see the definition in the section 
“Information: Different Meanings and Common Ground”). On a 
physical level, energy and information seem to be so alike that one 
hardly needs the term “information”; the single expression “energy” 
usually suffices. Two electrons, for example, repulse each other 
because of the negative electrical charge of each of them, but, in 
this process, the electrons exchange a photon. Is it not this photon 
that “informs” each particle of the charge of the other? How else 
would those particles get information about the other’s charge? How 
could a force that does not inform (in the most basic sense of the 
word) trigger such a repulsion or any other action? 
On higher levels of reality, increasing differentiation between 
the two notions of energy and information seems to occur, but, even 
there, information without the presence or consumption of energy 
is just as impossible as is the transfer of energy without information 
(in the physical sense as mentioned earlier). Furthermore, the question 
lingers on as to whether energy without information could be the 
ultimate impetus for moving this world and holding everything 
together, be it the tiniest subatomic particle or the entire cosmos. 
How could all those entities be bound to each other without some 
flow of information between them? Even physicists admit that the 
four forces of nature (interactions) are negotiated by the exchange 
of a particle that acts as a kind of information. 
Mind and Matter versus Information and Energy? 
Perhaps the philosophers’ long-standing dispute about the 
duality of mind and matter could find a resolution in the duality 
or even quasi-identity of information and energy. Such an idea could 
be traced to Schopenhauer’s (1958) work The World as Will  and 
Representation. This philosophy already emphasized the energy-
enforcing as well as the information-representational aspects of our 
universe. 
But, speculation aside, the fact is that our present ideas about 
‘‘information”-and the latter’s relationship to such similar 
expressions such as “data,” “message,” “knowledge,” etc.-are not 
yet sufficiently clear. In spite of Machlup’s (1980, pp. 56-58) significant 
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endeavor, this issue will require further examination that is not likely 
to be completed overnight. After all, i t  took physicists centuries to 
recognize the essence of energy and its relationship to such notions 
as force, work, heat, and many other variables. 
Assuming a holistic point of view and tracing information back 
to the physical level, one may conclude, as a first item, that every 
manifestation of active or potential energy is connected to some kind 
of information, just as the transmission of any kind of information 
requires active or potential energy. Under the admission that, on 
one side, the forces of nature constitute a kind of enforcing (or 
compelling) information and, on the other side, that no information 
transmission can take place without material things (i.e., potential 
or active energy such as light, air, books, etc.), the above proposition 
is difficult to refute. 
Second, the physical interactions (and their corresponding 
particles) seem to be the most basic medium for transmitting 
information as well as energy-though physicists and philosophers 
still speculate about the possibility of superluminal or instantaneous 
information. Since photons and gravitons belong to these elementary 
particles, light and other electromagnetic waves as well as gravity 
must be counted to such basic information media. 
Third, the ultimate source and very essence of energy still lacks 
scientific explanation, and something similar is true with regard to 
information. A recent insight of physics holds that the total energy 
in the cosmos is zero. Stephen Hawking (1988), one of the most reputed 
experts, points out that matter in this universe is regarded as positive 
energy because the gravitational field that causes all pieces of matter 
to be drawn to each other is a kind of negative energy: “two pieces 
of matter that are close to each other have less energy than the same 
two pieces a long way apart, because you have to expend energy 
to separate them against the gravitational force that is pulling them 
together” (p. 129). He also indicates that this negative energy has 
been demonstrated to be exactly equal in amount to the total positive 
energy of the universe. 
This gives rise to the inference that the ultimate explanation 
of existence may not be found in energy but in a kind of “fluctuating 
nothingness” (e.g., a gigantic quantum fluctuation) that-under the 
possible impact of some information-is capable of splitting into 
positive energy (matter) and negative energy (gravitational attraction). 
Fourth, in examining different levels of reality-cf. the “onion 
model of reality” suggested in Mattessich (1991a)-one discovers 
emergent properties that give rise to different kinds of information 
on each level. On the purely physical level, there always seems to 
be enforcing information, yet this information is not necessarily 
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deterministic; occasionally it is probabilistic. If the information 
conveyed by a photon between two electrons compels the electrons 
to repulse each other, one may speak of enforcing (or compelling) 
information as well as deterministic information; whereas, the 
information “controlling” the decay of a radium atom, though no 
less inevitable, does not affect a uniquely determined a-particle for 
expulsion from the nucleus but randomly compels one among many. 
Climbing the next major step in this hierarchy to the level of biological 
reality, probabilistic information seems to become more frequent (e.g., 
the transmission of hereditary information), while further steps 
upward, on the levels of psychological and social reality, one 
encounters nonenforcing (voluntaristic or quasi-voluntaristic) 
information-the response to which is subject to the “will” of a 
human being or animal of more or less higher order. This 
nonenforcing information is the one most frequently identified with 
the commonplace notion of information. 
Information: Different Meanings and Common Ground 
A major feature of nonenforcing information (in contrast to 
enforcing information) is its influence on the intentions and 
expectations of the individual, be it a human being or an animal. 
A major concern of information economics, for example, is the effect 
which information has upon a person’s expectations and the resulting 
decisions she or he may contemplate or enact. Most economists are 
even prone to regard only those data as genuine information that 
are capable of changing a person’s expectation about a certain event. 
Since these expectations are best quantified by means of probabilities 
assigned to future events (states of the world, including nature, actions 
of competitors, etc.), the relationship between information signals 
and changing probabilities becomes crucial. 
However, alongside the information for predictive purposes there 
exists information for contractual purposes as well as for retrospective 
uses (such as historical and learning purposes). Butterworth et al. 
(1982)suggested a total of seven even more refined categories of uses 
for information. 
In genetic biology, however, the emphasis is on the transmission 
of genetic information, on the “syntactical” as well as on the 
“semantic” sequence of the nucleic acids, and, above all, on the 
consequences or “actions” that result from a specific information 
transfer (e.g., a genetic defect of the individual concerned). In electrical 
engineering, “information theory” (more appropriately called 
“communication theory”)3 also has a semantic overtone. But, apart 
from measuring the information content (in bits*), the concern is 
on the redundancy of information and on the ability to decode a 
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string of information distorted by noise. Ecology and the systems 
sciences concentrate more on the cybernetic or feedback mechanism 
in which information plays an indispensible role. In library science, 
the emphasis shifts from information to knowledge, its preservation 
and obsolescence, as well as its manifestations in different media. 
Today, many scientific disciplines use the term “information” 
in one way or another. The term is now commonplace within a wide 
academic spectrum that includes astronomy, electrical engineering, 
biochemistry, medicine and biology, psychology and the behavior 
sciences, the economic sciences, as well as the humanities. And, 
although there are differences in meaning between the application 
of this expression to each discipline, in order to understand the very 
nature of the concept of information, i t  is advisable to explore the 
similarities of those meanings or, at least, the interrelations (in 
Wittgenstein’s sense of “family resemblances”) between those 
meanings (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953; Mattessich, 1978, p. 96). 
Bunge and Ardila (1987), for example, distinguish between the 
following seven different ways in which this term is used: 
information, = meaning (semantic information) 
information:!= structure of genetic material (genetic “information”) 
informationg = signal 
information, =message carried by a pulse-coded signal 
information, =quantity of information carried by a signal in a system 
information, =knowledge 
information, = communication of information, (knowledge) by social 
behavior (e.g., speech) involving a signal (information,). (p. 106) 
But the confusion behind this array of terms can easily be 
eliminated by two steps: (1) by qualifying each term, and (2)by 
showing how the concepts behind those terms are interrelated. 
If one defines information as “the configurative, pictorial, or 
conceptual representation5 of an empirical phenomenon possessing 
the potential of changing the action, intention or expectation of an 
entity in such a way that without this information the entity would 
act, intend or expect differently,”6 then the following relations and 
notions emerge: 
1. 	 Semantic information turns out to be information that states or 
clarifies the relation between either a term or a concept and the 
corresponding empirical phenomenon. This may be regarded as 
useful or efficient information (see note 6) if some person receiving 
i t  would act, intend, or expect differently (than without receiving 
it) as far as her or his semantic attitude is concerned.7 
2. 	Genetic information is a specific sequence of nucleic acids in the 
DNA of a virus, plant, or animal which (in a sequence of further 
steps) ultimately determines (or codetermines) the production of 
572 LIBRARY TRENDSISPRING 1993 
certain enzymes, proteins, and so on that could not be produced 
without this information. 
3. A signal or data (datum) might be regarded as a medium possibly 
carrying some information. To confuse the signal with the 
information is similar to confusing the box containing a present 
with the present itself. Depending on convention and other factors, 
different signals may, for example, convey the same information, 
or the same signal may, in different situations, convey different 
information.8 
4. A message might best be regarded as data, information, or 
knowledge in the process of communication. 
5. 	The quantity as well as the quality of an information has to be 
distinguished from the information itself. To identify either 
quantity or quality (including value) with information proper 
would be similar to confusing a parcel’s weight or value, 
respectively, with the content of the parcel. 
6. Most human knowledge, whether pragmatic or scientific, is ulti- 
mately hypothetical (certainly as far as i t  is contained in universal 
propositions). And a hypothesis is the attempt to represent some 
empirical phenomenon; it is not the phenomenon itself. The rela- 
tion between information and knowledge may be compared to 
that between raw material or component on one side and a larger 
system containing this component on the other. 
For example, the imprint on a sandy beach, which Robinson 
Crusoe noticed, was a signal carrying the information that this 
is a footprint. But the resulting thought that this forlorn island 
must recently have been visited by another person constitutes the 
knowledge induced and supported by the earlier mentioned 
information. 
Another illustration of the relation between information and 
knowledge was offered in Mattessich (1974, p. 783; 1978, p. 231), 
where the plotting of different data in a two-dimensional diagram 
(cost/production) constitutes information, while the process of 
connecting these data (e.g., curve fitting by statistical or 
econometric means) creates knowledge. 
In Mattessich (1978), scientific knowledge is characterized as law- 
like statements sufficiently supported by appropriate evidence, 
acceptable as (provisional) truth by a certain branch of science (p. 
231). Thus, information should not be equated with knowledge. 
To do so would be like mistaking the ruler with the people who 
bestow the power upon him or her. Though knowledge may depend 
on relevant information, the former contains a “creative” element 
which information lacks. Figure 1 illustrates this: a handful of data 
of operating costs under varying production volumes (left-hand 
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side) offers nothing but information (in the form of data). Only 
after the creative act of fitting a curve to this information does 
one get a hypothesis (right-hand side). This hypothesis can be 
expressed in a formula or sentence and becomes scientific 
knowledge as soon as the experts agree that, first, enough data 
have been collected and, second, that the cost curve is the best 
among all feasible alternatives. 
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Figure 1. (a) Information in form of cost data (evidence). (b) Knowledge 
in form of a cost hypothesis (with supporting evidence). 
But a piece of information may itself be of a hypothetical nature 
and may thus assume characteristics of knowledge similar to a 
vassal who plays the ruler in his or her own backyard. Thus, i t  
may depend on the context whether something should be regarded 
as information rather than knowledge. A related idea is expressed 
by Machlup (1980, pp. 56-58). He too recognizes a clear and 
meaningful difference between information and knowledge but 
admits that sometimes “the contents of the information received 
may be the same as the contents of what is known as a result” 
(p. 57). He continues to suggest that, as regards content, all 
information is knowledge while not all knowledge is information. 
7. 	 Communication is the transmission of either signal, information, 
or knowledge from one person or place to another. Its metaphor 
is that of transportation-e.g., the shipping of the components 
of a bicycle by truck from one place to another. Thereby the wheels 
and other individual parts compare to information, the wrappings 
of those components compare to the signals, the entire bicycle 
compares to knowledge, and the box in which all this is shipped 
would be the metaphor for the message. 
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Some further reflection may be required as to the connection 
between different information concepts on different reality levels. 
Above all, the question arises whether the natural sciences’ meaning 
of information, which is to be empirical, can be reasonably related 
to the social sciences’ and humanities’ notion of information, which 
is to be conceptual. Compare genetic information, which is 
undeniably something physical (a DNA molecule or part of it), with 
economic information (e.g., the quotation of a negotiated price) which 
obviously is conceptual. The above-stated definition stipulated 
information to be “the configurative, pictorial, or conceptual 
refwesentation of an empirical phenomenon ....” That means i t  is not 
supposed to be the empirical phenomenon itself but its representation. 
How can this chasm between information as a real thing (in the 
natural sciences) and as some representation” (in the social sciences 
and humanities) be reconciled?g 
To resolve this dilemma, one has to consider that every 
representation, even a conceptual one, can only be achieved by means 
of material things. Thus, the first point is to bear in mind that for 
any kind of representation (whether for scientific or everyday activity), 
one needs physical things, such as air and sound waves; or ink and 
paper; magnetized tapes and decoding machines; electromagnetic 
waves and television sets; and above all, neurons, electro-chemical 
reactions, and neural transmitters, and so on. In other words, one 
is always representing (i.e., approximating) reality, whether i t  is 
physical, psychic, or social, by means of physical reality. That is 
to say, representation is relative to the level from which one looks 
at it. Assume an object is represented on a television screen; such 
a television picture then becomes a (pictorial) representation, but 
somebody may describe this picture verbally, which then becomes 
itself the object of further representation-though, in this case, a 
conceptual one. 
The second point is that nature itself has various means of 
representing itself. The cloning of a paramecium, for example, is 
not only a self-replication but also a self-representation-this may 
be particularly obvious in the case of miosis, when the chromosomes 
and their genes are being copied, hence also represented confi- 
guratively. And our definition of information deliberately included 
not only conceptual but also configurative as well as pictorial 
representation as possible candidates for information. Thus,  
conceptual representation (and the information conveyed by it) can 
be viewed as a natural extension of configurative and pictorial 
representation. Of course, conceptual representation is undoubtedly 
the form most important for the social level of reality. Where would 
we be without i t? lo  
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THEECONOMICS KNOWLEDGE,OF INFORMATION, 
AND EDUCATION 
The economics of information, knowledge, and education area 
consists of two major parts, “information economics” (IE) and “the 
economics of knowledge and education” (EKE), each of which may 
further be subdivided.11 The two pioneers of IE are Jacob Marschak 
(e.g., 1954, 1964, 1974; also his work co-authored with Miyasawa, 
1968; and, with Radner, 1972), who made decisive contributions to 
what he called the “economics of information,” and George Stigler 
(1961, 1962), who received the 1982 Nobel Memorial Prize for his 
seminal work in the “economic theory of information” (together 
with his theory of public regulation). Another pioneer, Fritz Machlup 
(e.g., 1962, 1980, 1982, 1984), laid the groundwork and elaborated 
on what has become the “economics of the production and 
distribution of knowledge” (here addressed as the “economics of 
knowledge and education”). 
In the wake of these pioneers and their publications followed 
a host of other authors who greatly expanded each of these fields 
or branched out into new related ones. However, today the pioneering 
efforts of Stigler as well as Marschak have influenced the central 
core of standard economics to a greater extent than the work of 
Machlup. Although such a trend may reverse itself in the future, 
this article will have to consider the evolution of IE (and its fusion 
with agency-contract theory, as well as subsequent developments, 
such as the “economics of imperfect information,” including the 
“theory of asymmetric information”), in spite of the fact that EKE 
might have a closer affinity to library science. 
Information Economics as an Extension of Decision Theory 
In the following discussion, the attempt is made to sketch, in 
rough strokes, the development of information economics and 
economics of knowledge and education in a way comprehensible to 
noneconomists. IE analyzes the economic consequences of, as well 
as the demand for, alternative information systems. As Feltham (1984) 
points out: 
the development of models of rational choice under uncertainty by such 
pioneers as von Neumann and Morgenstern ...can be viewed as the starting 
point of information economics. They demonstrated that if an 
individual’s choice behavior satisfies a few rather basic “consistency” 
axioms, then his behavior can be represented as the maximization of 
his expected utility for the consequences of the actions available to him. 
(pp. 181-82) 
Thus, IE is an extension of statistical decision theory12 which usually 
begins with a finite number of strategies or possible actions to be 
chosen by the decision maker (e.g., alternative crops to be planted), 
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as well as a number of alternative states of the world (e.g., different 
weather situations) which are beyond the control of the decision 
maker. To each of these combinations (of crops and weather 
alternatives), an estimated payoff value (e.g., a dollar-profit) is 
assigned. If each state of nature has a known (or estimated) probability 
of occurrence (determined, for example, by long-term weather 
forecasts),i t  is simple to calculate not only the expected payoff (i.e., 
average value) of each combination, but also of each strategy, covering 
all alternative states of weather. Finally, among these alternatives, 
the strategy with the highest expected payoff is chosen. 
Information economics, the most important theorem of which 
was proven by Blackwell (1951, 1953),’3 introduces explicitly to this 
basic statistical decision model the notion of information. It asks 
how can each strategy (e.g., of crop planting) be improved by an 
information system (e.g., subscribing to a long-term weather 
forecasting information service), provided the probabilities of a 
successful forecast of each state can be estimated (e.g., from the track 
record of this service). Again, the expected value of each strategy, 
now in light of the weather forecast, can be calculated and compared 
with the expected value from the earlier-mentioned decision model 
(i.e., without benefit of a long-term weather forecasting service). The 
difference in each strategy is supposed to indicate the gross benefit 
of using the information system (i.e., subscribing to the forecasting 
service). The net benefit of each strategy results from deducting the 
information cost (i.e., subscription fee). But, most importantly, with 
the use of such an information system, the optimal strategy need 
no longer be the same as the one recommended by the simple decision 
model. Furthermore, similar analyses can be employed for competing 
information systems in order to choose the optimal system among 
them by determining not only the value of information but also the 
value of each of those systems. Thus, decision making, in the long- 
run, could be improved by using information which, (1) costs less 
than its net value, and (2)is cheaper than information supplied by 
another available information system. 
It is not difficult to construct a simple information-economic 
illustration relating to library science. Assume, for example, a profit- 
oriented library (common in Europe not too long ago) wants to 
maximize profit by allocating its acquisition budget to attain an 
optimal combination of books from different categories (such as 
classical fictions, mystery stories, do-it-yourself books, popular science 
books, and so on). Different combinations become different strategies; 
varying future trends in readers’ tastes become different states; and 
a research service, investigating and predicting changing readers’ 
tastes, becomes the information system. In the case of a public library 
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(without profit motive), the goal of profit maximization would have 
to be substituted by some kind of utility optimization which, however, 
would create further difficulties of measurement and concep- 
tualization. 
Information and Team Theory 
Marschak’s seminal (1954) paper explored the finding of what 
is currently called the optimal “information structure”14 within a 
firm. In other words, which information and communication scheme 
between individual entities or persons (e.g., departments or their heads 
as a “team”) is most desirable for attaining the goal of the entire 
enterprise? Or who (in a firm or other entity, perhaps even in a library) 
has to know what, and who has to report or communicate to whom? 
This analysis was later greatly elaborated on in Marschak and Radner 
(1972). By its very nature, this research focussed on internal 
relationships between persons of supposedly common interest. This 
stimulated much interest in circles of game and decision theory, 
organization theory, as well as academic accounting. Indeed, there 
exists considerable literature-particularly in the application of the 
team-theoretical aspects of information economics to accounting 
theory-pioneered by Butterworth (1968, 1972), Feltham (1967, 1968, 
1972), Mock (1969,1971), Demski (1970,1972/80), Feltham and Demski 
(1970), Demski and Feltham (1972, 1976), and others. 
Information and the Market 
However, external relationships were neglected by this kind of 
information research, and i t  is in the area of market information 
where another seminal paper, that by Stigler (1961), filled in a crucial 
gap. He was led, as admitted in his memoirs (cf. Stigler, 1988, pp. 
79-80), to the problem of information by the obvious fact that, when 
shopping around long enough, one can often find a lower price for 
a (homogenous) commodity than originally encountered-this is 
contrary to the teachings of traditional economics of perfect 
competition. He also noticed that i t  costs time and often money to 
search for a better price, and stipulated that the major obstacle to 
a complete search in finding the best price are the information costs. 
But the latter are a type of “transaction costs” which around the 
same time were exposed by Coase (1960), another Nobel laureate, 
as crucial in impeding the workings of perfect competition according 
to standard economic theory. 
But not even the work of a Nobel laureate is beyond criticism, 
and Phlips (1988, pp. 26-27) discusses the limitations of Stigler’s work, 
which later stimulated others to overhaul some of his ideas either 
partially or even fully. Phlips claims that, in reality, consumers are 
usually aware of which shops are expensive and which are inexpensive, 
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but less so about the distribution of prices-which is opposite to 
the assumption of Stigler, who also fails to offer an analysis of price 
distribution. Furthermore, Stigler assumes that the number of price 
searches (and other search rules) is determined beforehand, while it 
would be more realistic to keep the number of searches open ended 
and take a certain learning process into consideration. Thus, Stigler’s 
search rule is not optimal, while a sequential rule (after each price 
quotation the buyer decides whether to continue his or her search) 
is claimed to be optimal (cf. Rothschild, 1974). 
Some publications by another Nobel laureate, Arrow (e.g., 1984a, 
1984b, 1979), show the latter’s long-standing interest in IE. In a way, 
it was Arrow who created the preconditions that tie IE to the rest 
of modern neo-classical theory. Other economists as well as 
accounting academics contributed to this area, particularly to the 
special problem of public information. Hirschleifer (1971) provided 
the original analysis of public information (under pure market 
conditions and other stringent assumptions), and others, like 
Hakansson et al. (1982), Kunkel (1982), and Ohlson (1988), extend 
this analysis (the latter two papers included production conditions). 
Ohlson (1988) also examined the social or welfare value of public 
information, attempting to evaluate under what conditions does 
public information have value at all. 
If the consumer has all the competing prices at his disposal, 
one speaks of complete information. But, first of all, this is rarely 
the case in actual practice, and second, such a situation is analytically 
less interesting than cases of incomplete information. Thus, i t  is 
hardly surprising if in recent times one prefers to speak of the 
“economics of incomplete information.” 
A large amount of research has evolved in this area, well surveyed 
by Phlips (1988), Laffont (1989), and others. It ranges from an 
examination of information sequences (e.g., predecision versus post- 
decision information) to different types of auctions, price dispersions, 
predatory pricing, signals and “signaling theory,” credit rationing, 
antitrust implications, different kinds of economic equilibria, 
contingent markets and constraining contract clauses, competition 
among agents, even to cheating and misinformation. 
One of the most influential ideas in this area is the notion of 
informational asymmetry, which is characteristic for most situations 
of market uncertainty. This notion is best illustrated by Akerlof’s 
(1970) widely known paper “The Market for ‘Lemons’,” which uses 
the second-hand car market to analyze and demonstrate the 
informational advantage the dealer has over the prospective buyer 
(the dealer is more likely to know about the accidents and repairs 
of a specific second-hand car than is the buyer). This phenomenon 
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is widespread wherever contracts are being entered into, be i t  in hiring 
a manager or other employee (where the person to be hired knows 
much better her or his qualifications, as well as shortcomings, than 
the prospective employer does) or a medical insurance contract (where 
the person to be insured is often much better aware of his ailments 
than the insurer) or many other contractual arrangements. Its major 
conclusion confirms the insight that the optimal policy of the seller 
is to abstain from revealing some information (e.g., the product’s 
quality), if the latter cannot be readily verified. But if such verification 
is possible, i t  is economically optimal for the seller to grant a warranty 
to the buyer, which in turn induces the production of better qualities. 
Information Economics and Agency Theory15 
The notions of asymmetric information as well as those of moral 
hazard and adverse selection (both explained later) have helped to 
develop another subarea of economics closely related to IE, namely 
agency theory, which deals with employment contracts and similar 
contractual arrangements in which information is crucial. 
The first publications systematically analyzing the problems of 
work and management contracts were those by Coase (1937) and Simon 
(1951), both of whom received, decades later, the Nobel Memorial 
Prize. Yet, these publications found little immediate acknowledgment, 
and it  took approximately two decades until a more widely accepted 
version of the principal-agency relations evolved. In economics, i t  
was the paper by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and in business 
administration a successive paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
which provided the actual launching basis. Shortly before, special 
aspects of similar contracts were analyzed in two fundamental papers 
by Mirrlees (1971, 1976) as well as by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971). 
The integration of all those and a considerable number of later 
research efforts led to what has become known as “agency theory.” 
But there is an  essential difference between this originally 
predominantly descriptive agency theory and the subsequent 
predominantly analytical agency theory which one may address as 
agency-information analysis (also called “agency-contracting 
theory”). 
The central problem of the original agency theory lies in the 
costs incurred by the potential goal conflict between principal and 
agent (e.g., monitoring of an agent’s activity, profit reduction due 
to goal conflicts between the two parties, foregoing actions preferred 
by the agent in consideration of the principal’s different preferences- 
in the last case, for example, the agency costs are borne by the agent). 
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Closely related to this problem is the search for a Pareto-optimal 
contract (i.e., no party is worse off than before “contracting,” but 
at least one party may be better off afterward) that motivates the 
agent but hopefully also enables risk sharing with the principal. 
Thereby the (accounting) information system employed plays a vital 
role. In this way, the agent (whose activity cannot always be 
monitored) shall be motivated in such a way that his or her interest 
coincides with that of the principal (self-enforcing contract) such 
that “agency costs”-i.e., the costs caused by the goal conflict between 
the two parties-be reduced to a minimum. In the realm of finance, 
agency theory tried to analyze the motivations and relations caused 
by certain shifts between internal and external financing in order 
to search for an optimal financing ratio. Such a finance theory may 
be more realistic than the theory of the two Nobel laureates, 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), which does not seem to recognize this 
kind of optimization problem. 
However, as Butterworth and Falk (1986) have pointed out, within 
the predominantly descriptive approach of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976),i t  was neither possible to examine the equilibrium conditions 
of such a contracting model, nor certain consequences (e.g., bonding 
and monitoring features voluntarily accepted by the agent) which 
possibly might arise from this theory. Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 
1979) have even attempted to incorporate political costs (e.g., 
connected with the lobbying for accounting standards) into the agency 
model. And the publication by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) 
supplied early empirical tests to the agency theory. 
Another phase of what has been called “the stewardship 
tradition” of accounting (see Mattessich 1990) arose out of the 
combination of descriptive agency theory on one side and information 
economics on the other. For many years, there was not much contact 
between descriptive agency theory and information economics, but, 
with increasing form;alization of the former and the realization of 
the importance of information in contracting relations, both camps 
became aware of the need for a close cooperation, or even an 
amalgamation, of those research areas. For this reason, i t  is well 
justified to speak of “agency-information analysis” when referring 
to the analytical approach of agency theory. Its core is also to be 
found in the contractual relations, in risk sharing between principal 
and agent, as well as in improving the motivation of the latter. 
Depending on the type of employment contract, management’s 
share of the total enterprise profit (before its remuneration) might 
span a wide spectrum limited by two extremes: (1) on the one side 
we find a fixed managerial salary (under full monitoring of the 
manager’s activity by the principal), whereby the total remaining 
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profit goes to the principal who bears all the risk (principal is risk 
neutral, agent is risk averse); and (2)whereas the other extreme is 
found in the renting of a business by the agent such that the principal 
receives a fixed rent, and the agent, who bears all the risk, pockets 
the remaining profit (principal is risk averse, agent is risk neutral). 
There exist many types of contracts in between these extremes. Some 
lead to a Pareto-optimal profit and risk sharing between the two 
parties in accordance with classical marginal economic theory 
(principal and agent are both either risk neutral or risk averse). All 
these so-called “first-best solutions” are of less practical interest than 
the so-called “second-best solutions,” because only the latter offer 
the means to cope with two crucial issues: 
1. The problem of moral hazard. This arises from the agent’s or the 
principal’s temptation to act in one’s own interest even if the 
contractual interest of the other party is thereby shortchanged. 
As the principal can usually not fully monitor the agent’s activity- 
and since agency-information theory assumes that each party 
maximizes its own utility-the agent’s optimal action may not 
be optimal for the principal (unless special contractual 
arrangements, as recommended by this theory, are being made). 
2. The problem of adverse selection. In many situations there exists 
an asymmetry of information between principal and agent (often, 
but not always, in favor of the agent). So, for example, the manager 
may have an information advantage over the principal due to the 
former’s better or more specialized training and experience (for 
further illustrations of asymmetric information see the earlier 
section on “Information and the Market”). If, therefore, one party 
withholds some information, which otherwise would lead the other 
party to choose a contract or action less favorable to the first but 
more favorable to the second party, then this adverse selection 
impedes a first best solution. 
A major task of agency information analysis, therefore, is to find 
conditions under which a Pareto or quasi-Pareto optimal contract 
between both parties can be obtained. That is to say, one searches 
for an incentive and risk-sharing scheme which is optimal for both 
parties. Such an analysis would take care of both, the problem of 
moral hazard as well as that of adverse selection. Here again the 
aim is the efficient contract that leads to a compromise between two 
opposing tendencies: on one side one has to find an efficient risk- 
sharing contract between principal and agent. On the other side, 
i t  is necessary to motivate the manager sufficiently to act in the interest 
of the principal-indeed, research has shown that contracts which 
are risk efficient are inefficient as regards motivation. Through 
582 LIBRARY TRENDVSPRING 1993 
elimination of more and more restrictions on one side and further 
enrichments of the model on the other, many variations of this basic 
agency-information model have been created under the application 
of a good deal of mathematics. 
Such agency contracts should be capable of reducing the agency 
costs to a minimum and enable an optimal position for both parties. 
Yet the capital risk need not only rest on the shoulders of principal 
and agent, i t  may also rest on those of other investors and creditors. 
Thus,  agency-information analysis has a wide spectrum of 
application, particulary in economics, modern finance, and 
accounting theory. The  contracts with creditors (e.g., bond 
indentures) might possibly be incorporated into a sophisticated 
agency-information model under consideration of market equilibrium 
(i.e., the prices are such that all goods can be cleared). Credit contracts 
may be represented as contingent claims toward the assets of the 
borrowing person or firm. This is the starting point of contingent 
claims analysis in which the price of the assets is determined by 
such stochastic processes as logarithmic-normal distribution. Black 
and Scholes (1973) have pioneered an equilibrium model for stock 
options under a simple capital structure of the pertinent enterprise. 
This work was extended and further developed by Merton (1973a, 
1973b, 1974, 1976), Brennan and Schwartz (1977, 1978, 1979), Cox and 
Ross (1976a, 1976b), and others and was also applied to other areas. 
For a survey of contingent claims analysis, we refer to Hughes 
(1984); for the application of agency theory to the area of finance, 
we refer to Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1985); and for the application 
to accounting, we refer to the following papers in Mattessich (1984); 
Feltham (1984); Baiman (1982); and Butterworth, Gibbins, and King 
(1982) who offer an appropriate overview. In each of these areas, 
the agency-information analysis was instrumental in clarifying a 
series of problems. See also the following five anthologies: Pratt and 
Zeckhauser (1985), Feltham et al. (1988), Bamberg and Spremann 
(1989), Hahn (1989), and Laffont and Moreaux (1991). For further 
references on agency-information analysis, see Baiman (1990), 
Eisenhardt (1989), and Mattessich (1991c, pp. 25-29). 
Economics of Knowledge and Education 
As previously mentioned, economics of knowledge and education 
was pioneered as well as further elaborated on by Machlup (1962, 
1980, 1982, 1984). In contrast to information economics, much of 
which is analytical and highly mathematical, EKE is predominantly 
empirical and of ten descriptive; above all, it explores the economic 
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aspects of the production and distribution of knowledge rather than 
dealing “merely” with information. 
Our century has created conditions under which the long- 
neglected economic side of knowledge creation, as well as of 
education, finally had to be subjected to careful analysis. Already 
a quarter of a century ago, i t  was estimated by Young and Margerison 
(1969) that scientific information increases a hundred times faster 
now than it  did around the turn of the century, and that the volume 
of research doubles every decade. 
It was Machlup (1962) who first took up  the challenge; the impact 
was immediate and led, still in the same decade, to a great number 
of publications, particularly in the subarea of education economics 
(see the later discussion in this section). One may even speak of a 
new industrial (information and knowledge) revolution as Miller 
(1983) did when he wrote Machlup’s epitaph in the foreword to 
Machlup and Mansfield (1983). There Miller pointed out that, in 
1959 and 1960, Fritz Machlup gave a series of invited lectures on 
this subject at Cornell and Fordham universities. 
The response to these lectures was so favorable that Machlup 
decided to expand the lectures into the book published in 1962. The 
concluding chapter of this book contains the following prophetic 
passage: “If employment opportunities continue to improve for high- 
level-knowledge-producing labor and to worsen for unskilled manual 
labor, the danger of increasing unemployment among the latter 
becomes more serious” (p. 397). This anticipated a trend that has 
not only continued but today constitutes one of the gravest threats 
to the social and economic health of the entire continent. 
Machlup estimated that, in the United States, the production 
and distribution of knowledge amounted to some 29 percent of the 
adjusted gross national product in 1958. This estimate was updated 
by Porat (1977) to 46 percent in 1967 and is most likely much higher 
today. In 1971, Machlup decided to continue and update his knowledge 
research by planning an eight volume work (approximately one book 
for each chapter of the 1962 book). Its first volume, published in 
1980, again deals with knowledge and knowledge production; the 
second volume, published in 1982, surveys the branches of learning. 
The information sciences and the analysis of the economic notion 
of human capital were originally also planned for volume 2 but, 
under pressure of increasing material, were later scheduled as separate 
volumes. Volume 3, dealing with the economics of information and 
human capital, was completed at the beginning of January 1983 (yet 
published in 1984). But, three weeks later, Machlup died of a heart 
attack at age eighty-one. However, during the last years of his life, 
in preparation for further work, Machlup, together with his 
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collaborator Una Mansfield, invited “39 information scientists to 
write a total of 56 essays on their various specialties so that,” as 
Miller says, “he [Machlup], in his role as an editor, could go to school 
under the experts-could ‘see the stir of the great Babel, and not 
feel the crowd’ ”16 (1983, p.x). 
Machlup’s approach is very broad and of ten reaches beyond the 
realm of economics. It illuminates the problems of knowledge and 
its creation from many sides and offers a wide panorama, ranging 
from philosophical reflections to semantical and economic analysis. 
His work covers various types of knowledge, knowledge production 
and knowledge industries, education, research and development, 
communication media and information services, the relation of 
knowledge production to the gross national product, to occupational 
structure, and many other topics. 
The trend that Machlup established was continued (even with 
regard to developing countries) by several authors among whom Porat 
(1977), Mandi (1981), Lamberton (e.g., 1971, 1984, 1988), Jussawalla 
and Lamberton (1982), Jussawalla et al. (1988) are only a few that 
deserve mention. Knowledge and information are put into relation 
with organizations, markets and their efficiencies, government 
policies and institutions, business planning, monopolies and 
monopolistic competition, and so on. 
But probably the widest response came from the economics of 
education. If this field is regarded as a branch of EKE, it certainly 
has its own pioneers. H. F. Clark (1928) published over sixty years 
ago a paper on “The Economic Effects of Education as Shown by 
Statements of Economists,” and such authors as T. W. Schultz (e.g., 
1959), Nobel laureate Tinbergen (1960), and Blaug (e.g., 1968, 1969, 
1970, 1978, 1987) published-from a relative early time onward- 
articles, bibliographies, anthologies, and books that pioneered and 
elaborated on this particular field. Indeed, since the 1960s, this area 
generated a great deal of interest and produced an enormous amount 
of literature (see the annotated bibliography by Blaug [1978bl which 
lists and describes well over a thousand publications). More recent 
publications-e.g., Wagner (1982), Worswick (1985), Psacharopoulos 
(1987), Siege1 (1988), and Cohn and Geske (1990)-have kept the trend 
up to date. 
INFORMATION, AND DEPRECIATIONKNOWLEDGE, 
The entire literature of information and knowledge economics 
pays little attention to the issue of depreciation. It was mentioned 
in the earlier section on “Information: Different Meanings and 
Common Ground” (first paragraph) that many economists are 
inclined to regard as information (orvaluable information) only those 
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data that possess the potential of changing one’s expectation about 
the occurrence of a specific event. Hence, once this function has been 
fulfilled, and such a change in expectation has occurred, the general 
value of this information might quickly drop to zero (there exists 
plenty of literature dealing with the problem of public information 
(see the previous section “Information and the Market”). This implies 
that information (in the IE sense) may lose its value soon after it 
has been “exploited” just as a loaf of bread loses its value once it 
is consumed. This indicates that information-whether it serves 
intermediate (i.e., industrial) or final (i.e., household or go-
vernmental) consumption-is like a consumable good (to be written 
off at once) rather than as a durable good (to be depreciated over 
time). 
The situation is somewhat different as far as knowledge is 
concerned. Indeed, the reference indexes of Machlup’s books show 
a few entries under “depreciation.” Further examination shows that 
they refer to the depreciation of equipment or, what Machlup 
occasionally called, instruments of knowledge creation. Those scarce 
and short entries are not likely to satisfy scholars from library science, 
even though they may consider books and learned journals as 
belonging to these kinds of instruments. 
By now there is little doubt that information and knowledge 
are commodities that, in principle, could be depreciated or written 
off. Even accountants would have to agree, as they regard a commodity 
or asset as depreciable (in the broad sense of the word) if its value 
declines over time or suddenly. Since hardly anyone would question 
the fact that books, journals, and other library equipment (such as 
audio- and videotapes, etc.) can convey information and knowledge, 
these commodities are potential candidates for depreciation, and since 
their value usually declines (save for such exceptional cases as rare 
or antique books and documents), there seems to be justification 
for depreciating them. 
But such a simple answer may not be satisfactory, and the further 
question arises, “In which sense is this library material (i.e., books, 
etc.) itself information or knowledge, and to what extent is i t  merely 
conveying those valuable commodities?” Just as signals may be 
considered to be the wrappings or boxes in which information is 
packaged, so books and journals, etc. are the containers and 
storehouses of knowledge. Thus, as far as depreciation is concerned, 
a major distinction ought to be made-whether one depreciates some 
library material because of its physical deterioration (e.g., due to 
the acid paper used in those books), or whether the knowledge 
contained in this material has become obsolete. In both cases, 
depreciation may be justified but for different reasons. 
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Yet, occasionally, it may be difficult to determine when or how 
much a specific kind of knowledge has declined in value or has even 
lost all its usefulness. Sometimes a book considered out of fashion 
suddenly bounces back into vogue, or the knowledge contained in 
such a book becomes interesting from a historical perspective. And 
as to journals, their reference value, no less, turns often from “actual” 
to “historical,’’ thus extending considerably the material’s useful life. 
This obviously makes i t  more difficult to determine the depreciable 
lifetime of such journals. Whether analogue cases of knowledge 
depreciation in industry, as occurring in the case of patents of scientific 
discoveries or technical inventions (cf. Sweet, 1990), could supply 
guidance for libraries is questionable. 
A further question arising in this connection is the need for 
depreciation of library materials in public and university libraries. 
Where private libraries are concerned, the financial statements are 
likely to have relevance in determining the profitability of such 
enterprises. In the case of public libraries, on the other side, there 
seems to be little effort to measure the rate of return in dollars and 
cents; the aim is, at best, to estimate roughly the cultural or 
entertainment value of books and other holdings. Therefore, in public 
libraries, i t  is probably less the accounting question of how much 
to depreciate gradually every year than the question of “weeding” 
or eliminating material from the shelves and writing it off. As pointed 
out above, accountants often make a differentiation between gradual 
depreciations versus sporadic write-offs. A sudden decline in readers’ 
interest in specific material might justify such a write-off, though 
this need not be directly connected with the “knowledge value” of 
this material. To divine the reader’s interest in some library material 
or even the knowledge value seems to be a particularly difficult 
problem. 
Gupta (1990), for example, suggested (for the specific case of 
review articles in physics) to use the frequencies of material quoted 
in citation indexes as a means for evaluating readers’ interest in such 
publications. But this suggestion concerns only specific articles and 
not entire journals; furthermore, there is the fact that books are not 
included in most citation indexes. Both of these obstacles probably 
render Gupta’s approach of little use for the librarian’s depreciation 
problem. 
Finally, another aspect, hinted at before, has to be considered: 
the need to distinguish between the concefltual act of dollar-
depreciation (which is an accounting and financial matter) and the 
empirical erosion of this accumulated or stored knowledge, which 
accounting depreciation ought to reflect but often does not. Behind 
the notions of both, epistemic obsolescence as well as physical 
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deterioration, stand empirical phenomena. Yet the accountant’s 
depreciation in the ledger is purely conceptual (apart from her or 
his physical endeavor of carrying out this work, which concerns a 
different segment of reality) (cf. the earlier section on “Mind and 
Matter versus Information and Energy?”). 
NOTES 
I Financial support for this paper by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 

Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged. 

2 “In spite of its universality, the general notion of energy as a basic concept of science 

is a relatively recent result of a long and intricate conceptual process” (Jammer, 1967, 

p. 511). 
“Information theory” assumes that within a specific language there exists a 
probability distribution over the population of signals. Hence each signal (within 
a message) will be chosen with a certain probability [pi]. The ‘expected’ amount 
of information (measured in “bits”-see note 4) in the message is then: 
H= -&=,pi log, pi 
Since each signal is weighted by its chance of occurring, one obtains an average 
measure of the uncertainty in the total message. As van Gigch (1991, pp. 191-93) 
points out, H is defined as the degree of uncertainty, or the amount of “entropy” 
that exists in a specific situation. Alternatively, H can be interpreted as the amount 
of information, required to remove the prevailing uncertainty. 
A bit (abbreviation for “binary digit”) is the unit of binary information (e.g., as 
used in digital computers), expressing the information content of a message or even 
an entire system. Popularly expressed, one bit is the answer to a single yes or no 
question. Sagan (1977, pp. 23-26), points out, for example, that the Viking Landers 
that landed on Mars in 1976 had programs of a few million bits, which is somewhat 
more than the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) containing the entire genetic material 
of a bacterium. 
5 It should be noted that practically any representation (even the self-representation 
in genetic cloning, as the slight differences between two identical twins shows), is 
an approximation. 
6This definition might have to be supplemented by some related notions: the 
“usefulness” or “efficiency” of information which could be defined as the degree 
to which the action, intention or expectation (due to the information) is changed, 
and the “value of information” as the upper limit a rational person should be willing 
to pay for an information in a specific situation (for further reference to the “value 
of information,” see section in text entitled “Information Economics as an Extension 
of Decision Theory”). Obviously, both of these supplementary definitions involve 
difficulties, particularly problems of measurement and further conceptualization. 
van Gigch (1991, p. 190) too emphasizes the potential action or “counter action” 
(e.g., to counter “entropic” or disintegrating tendencies) which information entails. 
7 This definition would have to be modified if semantics is meant to include “model 
theory” (i.e., the semantics of mathematics and logic) which only deals with the 
relationships between concepts without regard to empirical phenomena. 
* A similar attitude is taken by Wilson who assumes data to be neutral and defines 
“information to be data plus the meaning attributed to it” (1991, P. 89). 
However, the fact that information in the social sciences is frequently of a conceptual 
nature, does not imply that social phenomena are conceptual, they are just as empirical 
as physical phenomena (cf. Mattessich, (1991a). 
lo One of the most important systematic, nonverbal conceptual representations of 
prehistoric times (in this case, from ca. 8000BC to 3000 BC) grew out of a configurative 
representation for the accounting of economic transactions (see Schmandt-Besserat, 
e.g., 1978, 1980, 1992, and Mattessich, e.g., 1987/90, 1991b). Cf. for example: 
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“Token accounting (by means of clay tokens or figurines) as well as cuneiform 
writing, and hieroglyphics, offer many examples of various steps by which 
morphological tokens (i.e., those with similarity to its referent) and pictographs (both 
of which seem to “show”) developed into abstract tokens and ideographs (both of 
which seem “to say”) ....Thus the morphological tokens not only describe structures, 
they themselves are structures” (Mattessich, 1987, pp. 88-89). 
l1 Neither this entire area nor the present paper include the vast field of Management 
Information Systems and related disciplines. For literature that might be relevant 
to the current topic with regard to methodological issues, see Olle et al. (1988); with 
regard to quantifying the financial benefits of information, see Kleijnen (1980); and 
with regard to more philosophical reflections, see Wand and Weber (1990). 
I* This is confirmed by Arrow (1984a) who points out in his Preface that “statistical 
method was an example for the acquisition of information,” but warns that it is 
difficult to formulate a general theory of information because different kinds of 
information have so far “no common unit.” This book also contains an excellent 
(though dated) survey article: Arrow (1984b), which is based on a presentation to 
businessmen, and thus relatively easy to comprehend, and offers insight into many 
aspects and implications of information economics. 
13 Blackwell regards one information system as more informative than another- 
precisely speaking, it should be “at least as informative”-as another, if  it is never 
less valuable (precisely, if there exists no other single-person decision situation in 
which it is less valuable). Cf. Feltham (1984, p. 182). 
14 Phlips distinguishes the following three elements contained in the information 
structure: “the set of possible states of the world, the set of possible signals, and 
the probability that a signal is observed, given that state prevails” (1988, pp, 1-2). 
The section entitled “Information Economics and Agency Theory” is partly based 
on Mattessich (1990, pp. 13-16). 
16 The collection of these articles, edited by Machlup and Mansfield (1983), was 
published posthumously to Machlup’s death. The present author had the honor of 
contributing three papers to this anthology-see Mattessich (1983a, 1983b, 1983~). 
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